Remembering Firefighter George Jackson

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On October 21, 1990, Firefighter George Jackson was assigned to engine company that was dispatched to a report of a stove fire at an occupied two-story brick row house in Camden, NJ. Upon arrival, firefighters found smoke showing from the rear of the structure causing the company officer to call for a box assignment at the location. Firefighter Jackson and his crew was shortly thereafter assigned to fire suppression and advanced a handline into the structure and conducted a search of the first floor.

When the ladder company arrived on scene and entered the structure with their crew, Firefighter Jackson split from the engine company and joined the ladder company to the second floor of the structure and began assisting in search. It was at this time that the fire in the kitchen on the first floor had proven too difficult to control along with the pump operate having difficultly opening the fire hydrant in front of the house to establish a water supply. Due to the issue with the hydrant outside, the pump operator of the engine radioed that crews should back of the structure due to water supply issues.  

At this time, the fire in the kitchen had began to spread rapidly prohibiting the firefighters from the ladder company on the second floor to exit the structure due to heat and fire conditions on the stairs. Three of the firefighters retreated back to the second floor and were able to exit the structure through second floor windows however, Firefighter Jackson was overcome by the conditions inside the structure and was unable to exit.  

Later arriving fire companies were able to establish an alternate water supply and suppress the fire that had spread onto the second floor. It was at this time, where firefighter accessing the second floor over ground ladders found Firefighter Jackson just inside the window and was extricated shortly thereafter. He suffered from critical hand and face burns and was transported to a nearby hospital. 

Firefighter George Jackson remained in a coma until his death on March 7, 2006 at the age of 67.

We remember…

Firefighter George Malcolm Jackson, Ladder 2, Camden Fire Department (NJ)

Remembering Lt. Arnie (Arnold) Wolff

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On Sunday, August 13, 2006, Lieutenant Arnie Wolff, assigned to the ambulance for the shift responded to a call at 438 Edgewood Drive around 12:30 afternoon. Upon arrival Lt. Wolff and his partner were assigned to assist the first due engine with attaching the 5-inch supply line to the engine for water supply. The engine company they were assisting with the supply line was currently conducting an attack on a suspected basement fire, while the ladder company was performing horizontal ventilation of the structure. The Incident Commander had then requested Lt. Wolff and his partner to conduct a primary search of the residence. With a few steps into the residence at around 12:34 PM, while beginning a lefthanded search, it was quickly noted there was near zero visibility with minimal heat conditions. Due to these conditions, the crew knelt down, sounded the ceramic floor and took one crawling step to advance in. Moments later, a large crack was heard just before the floor gave way, sending both firefighters into the basement.

A second alarm was immediately requested by the IC and rescue efforts began. The firefighter with Lt. Wolff fell into a finished portion of the basement and was assisted through a basement window by fellow firefighters. Lt Wolff fell into a room of the basement that did not have windows and his path to an exit was blocked. Due to the advanced fire conditions after the collapse, firefighters were unable to reach Lt. Wolff. His body was recovered 13 hours into the incident and his cause of death was asphyxiation due to smoke inhalation.

An autopsy was later performed and it was found that the carboxyhemoglobin level in Lieutenant Wolff's blood was 49.6 percent. The cause of the fire at the time was undetermined but it was concluded that the fire had been burning for some time in the basement prior to its discovery. The trusses that failed were in the area that was most damaged by fire. It is to be noted, the trusses that failed were TGI trusses, an engineered lumber product.

Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation Report F2006-26 | NIOSH | CDC

Arnie Wolff joined the Green Bay Fire Department in January 1989 and was currently assigned to Engine 451 at Station 5 and was also a paramedic. He was 5 days from receiving his promotion to lieutenant and was awarded it posthumously. Wolff leaves behind his wife and three children.

We remember…

Lt. Arnie (Arnold) Wolff, 55, Engine 451, Green Bay Fire Department

Remembering Lieutenant Nathan Flynn

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In the early morning of July 23, 2018, at approximately 0200hours, Howard County Department of Fire and Rescue Services was dispatched to lightning-caused structure fire in a single-family residence in Clarksville, Maryland.  

Shortly after arriving on scene, Lieutenant Nathan Flynn and his crew were advancing a hose line into the structure when the floor collapsed.  A Mayday was initiated around 0220hours by Lt. Flynn and another member of the crew. All of the crew members were rescued after about 20 minutes in burning basement at approximately 0245hours. 

Lt. Flynn was transported to the hospital but did not survive his injuries.  The cause of death was multiple injuries. 

He was the first line of duty death in the history of Howard County. 

Incident Location: 7000 Block of Woodscape Road, Clarksville, MD (U.S. National Grid: U.S. National Grid: 18S UJ 34363 39282 (DD: 39.187, -76.918)) 

Lessons Learned as per NIOSH 

  • Fire departments should ensure that crew integrity is properly maintained by visual (eye-to-eye), direct (touch), or verbal (voice or radio) contact at all times when operating in an immediately dangerous to life and health (IDLH) atmosphere. The intent is to prevent firefighters from becoming lost or missing

  • Fire departments should ensure incident commanders conduct a detailed scene size-up and risk assessment during initial fireground operations and throughout the incident including Side Charlie

  • Fire departments should develop and implement a standard operating procedure/guideline (SOP/SOG) to identify below-grade fires and ensure that appropriate tactical operations are implemented

  • Fire departments should ensure that a deployment strategy for low-frequency/high-risk incidents is developed and implemented for large area residential structures with unique architectural features

  • Fire departments should ensure that incident commanders develop an incident action plan (IAP) that matches conditions encountered during initial operations and throughout the incident

  • Fire departments should ensure that critical incident benchmarks and fire conditions are communicated to incident commanders throughout the incident. This is accomplished with effective fireground communications

  • Fire departments should have a procedure to ensure all members operating in the hazard zone have their radios on the designated radio channel

  • Fire departments should ensure all members and dispatchers are trained on the safety features of their portable radio, particularly the features useful during a Mayday

  • Fire departments should develop a process to prevent task saturation of incident commanders during multi-alarm incidents

  • Fire departments should ensure that the member assigned to the resource status and situation status function is not given other duties during an incident

  • Fire departments should develop a formal training program that defines the job duties and functions for staff aides, incident command technicians, or staff assistants

  • Fire departments should ensure incident commanders maintain control of situation status, resources status, and communications to ensure the completion of tactical objectives

  • Fire departments should incorporate the principles of Command Safety into the incident management system during the initial assumption of command. This ensures that strategic-level safety responsibilities are being incorporated into the command functions throughout the incident

  • Fire departments should review and/or develop SOG/SOPs to ensure that water supply is established during initial fireground operations, particularly in areas with limited or no hydrants

  • Fire departments should ensure adequate staffing and deployment of resources based on the community’s risk assessment

  • Fire department should periodically review and, if necessary, revise their SOP/SOG on the deployment of rapid intervention crews (RICs)

  • Fire departments should use resources from the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), Underwriter’s Laboratories (UL) Fire Safety Research Institute (FSRI), and the International Society of Fire Service Instructors (ISFSI) to develop and revise operational procedures on fireground tactics and provide training in fire dynamics in structures for all firefighting staff

  • Fire departments should consider having all members carry a wire cutting tool  

We remember… 

Lieutenant Nathan "Nate" Flynn, 34, Howard County Department of Fire and Rescue Services

Remembering the Southwest Inn Motel Fire - Houston, TX

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May 31, 2013 was the deadliest day in the history of Houston Fire Department. The Southwest Inn fire killed four Houston Fire Department members, injured many others with one additional firefighter who lost his life due to his injuries a few years later.

The Structure

The Southwest Inn Motel which was a well-known motel for many decades in the Houston area was located at 6855 Southwest Freeway in Houston, Texas. The property included the motel itself, with restaurant and bar spanning over 26,000 square feet. The layout consisted of the restaurant and bar being a single-story structure that was interconnected to the two-story structure that housed the motel's lobby, offices, banquet halls and meeting rooms. In addition to this facility, the property also housed seven individual two-story buildings of motel guest rooms, none of which were connected to the main interconnected building where the fire took place.

The motel was constructed of primarily wood-frame construction consisting of lightweight construction materials such as lightweight truss and combustible roof decking. The building did not contain a fire sprinkler or automatic fire alarm system. The one notable characteristic of this structure was the extruded concrete interlocking roof tiles over asphalt shingles used for the front-facing slopes over the banquet and restaurant areas.


The Incident

At 12:07PM, the Houston Fire Department was dispatched to the Southwest Inn for a reported fire. Engine 51 was located less than a mile from the motel and responded moments after the initial dispatch.

During their response in, Engine 51 (E51) officer reported heavy smoke visible and from there an immediate request by the Office of Emergency Communication to dispatch a working fire. Additional units reported dark grey and brown smoke coming from the structure will enroute to the scene.

Three and half minutes later upon arrival, E51 reported heavy smoke showing from the attic of the restaurant and will begin an offensive fire attack with a 2 1/2-inch line. This line was the rear preconnect from E51.

The district chief (D68) arrived on scene moments later and established command. The IC's first order was E51 evacuate the building because the operate of E51 advised the engine was down to a quarter tank of later. Engine 68 then arrived on scene and laid two 4-inch supply lines from E51 to a hydrant east of the structure and E51 from there was able to establish a water supply. E51's crew was then able to re-enter the structure with the back-up crew coming from E68 with another 2 1/2-inch line.

A fourth due engine company - Engine 82 was on scene advancing an 1 3/4-inch hoseline to the front door that was also entered by E51 when the roof collapsed occurred.

Within 12 minutes of Engine 51 (e51) arriving on scene and 15 and a half minutes of the initial dispatch the roof of the restaurant had collapsed. The captain of Engine 51 was at the front door during the collapse and pushed out of the building. The captain of Engine 82 called a "Mayday" and rapid intervention crew operations were initiated by Engine 60.

Due to the initial collapse of the roof and during the RIC operations taking place, a secondary wall collapsed occurred injuring several firefighter of the RIC team. The crew continued their efforts in located and removing the trapped firefighters. The captain of E68 was located and removed from the structure and transported to a local hospital. The engineer of E51 was removed from the structure as well however later died at a local hospital.

The search continued on for the captain of E51 and two remaining firefighters from E68. Approximately two hours had passed after the initial roof collapse and the body of the captain from E51 was located. The captain was found on top of the restaurant roof debris and the two missing firefighters from E68 were discovered underneath the debris. All three were pronounced dead at the scene.

Factors

• Unreported fire burning for 3 hours

• Delay in notifying the fire department

• Building construction

• Wind driven fire

• Scene size-up

• Accountability

• Fireground communications

• Lack of fire sprinkler system

Key Recommendations

• Based upon fire department procedures, the strategy and tactics for an occupancy should be defined by the organization for fire-fighting operations. The Incident Commander should ensure that the strategy and tactics match the conditions encountered during initial operations and throughout the incident

• Fire departments should review and update standard operating procedures on wind-driven fires which are incorporated into fireground tactics

• Fire departments should integrate current fire behavior research findings developed by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and Underwriter’s Laboratories (U.L.) into operational procedures by developing standard operating procedures, conducting live fire training, and revising fireground tactics

We Remember…

Captain Matthew Renaud, 35, Engine 51

Engineer Operator Robert Bebee, 41, Engine 58

Firefighter Robert Garner, 29, Engine 68

Probationary Firefighter Anne Sullivan, 24 Engine 68

Captain William "Iron Bill" Dowling, Engine 68, retired after the incident and passed away on March 7, 2017 due to injuries sustained from the incident.


Remembering Captain Mike Goodwin

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Philadelphia Fire Department Ladder 27 was dispatched as the Rapid Intervention Team also known as RIT to a structure fire at 748 South 4th Street in Philadelphia, PA on the evening of April 6, 2013. The fire began in the basement of a fabric store which had extended to the upper floors of the three story store front structure with apartments above. 

Captain Mike Goodwin was the officer in charge of Ladder 27 for the shift. Upon arrival, Ladder 27 RIT company staged their equipment near the command post and the IC (Incident Commander) assigned them to the roof of an adjacent structure to perform ventilation operations. It was at this time, Captain Goodwin reported to command there was heavy smoke conditions coming from the exposure they were shortly going to be operating on. Donned in full PPE w, Captain Goodwin fell 20 feet onto the roof of the building and shortly after fell through the roof into the fire building. 

Firefighters on scene reported this fall to the IC and rescue operations were quickly put into place in attempts to rescue Captain Goodwin. Due to limited access to the roof area and fire conditions, access was limited. During rescue efforts, firefighters breached an exterior brick wall to gain access to his location where he was removed from the structure and transported to the hospital. Additionally, Firefighter Andrew Godlinski was injured while attempting to rescue Captain Goodwin following the collapse before a second floor roof and two walls collapsed.

Captain Mike Goodwin of Ladder 27 was pronounced dead at the hospital due to what was listed as multiple blunt force injuries. He was posthumously promoted to Battalion Chief. 

Captain Goodwin is survived by his wife and two children. 

We Remember…

Captain Mike Goodwin, age 53, Philadelphia Fire Department, Ladder 27

Understand the Cause and Effect of Burnout

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Anyone who has listened to any podcast I'm on or seen me speak in person has heard me say, "To bring our A-game, we have to be on our A-game mentally. Burnout in first responders has been witnessed for years, but it was taboo to discuss due to the stigma of being unfit for duty. Fast forward to 2023, burnout is being discussed more often. We already know burnout is terrible, and the job can cause it, but what aspects of the job lead to burnout? More importantly, what can we do to lessen the blow of burnout, if not prevent it overall?

I created a short survey with questions about the participants' personal and work lives. There were 75 participants in the following areas: fifty-two firefighters, twelve EMS, two Law Enforcement, and nine classified as other, including 911 dispatchers, mental health crisis workers, and ER Nurses.

It is essential to highlight that all participants noted that their work has impacted their personal lives. When participants were asked what they felt the biggest morale killer was for their department, 57.3% identified it as leadership. Other factors included staffing at 20% and policies at 6.7%. Shockingly, 43.3% of individuals found that they lacked access to professional support at work. Participants were also asked if they find it difficult to go to work, which 31.1% agreed to. An overwhelming amount of individuals (64%) reported feeling underappreciated or undervalued at work. These statistics call into question how these numbers are impacting someone's livelihood. Out of the 75 participants, 64% of individuals found themselves to be more irritable or losing patience with others. We must then question how the patience of workers impacts their quality of work with others, whether colleagues or patients. 

When discussing personal lives, 29.7% of individuals reported they felt they were withdrawing from friends and family. I was curious as well if participants noticed an increase in using drugs or alcohol more frequently, which 29.3% of individuals agreed to an increase in substance use. I also proposed the question of whether individuals feel less motivated to do things they enjoy, and a shocking amount of 58.6% of individuals agreed. When individuals lose motivation for something they enjoy, their work ethic declines, often because they are too burned out to use their regular leisure activities. The word burnout holds weight to it in this line of work, but the question must be asked, "Do you feel burned out from your job?". In response to this question, 52% of individuals agreed or strongly agreed. As a leader, I questioned what departments can do to relieve some of the feelings and concerns that each individual expressed in the survey. Some responses on how to improve morale within a department included team building (26.7%), more frequent input on department policies (29.3%), and more frequent meetings with leadership (25.3%).

All three responses can prove effective, but how do you implement them? Team building is a favorite tactic of mine. What exactly is team building? Team building is an ongoing process that helps a work group evolve into a cohesive unit. The team members share expectations for accomplishing group tasks and trust, support, and respect one another's differences. A leader can hold team building on shift or off shift. One of the best techniques to do on shift is hands-on training. I've often found that morale is high when we hold department training events in my department. What about taking team building away from work? Group outings to sporting events, concerts, days on a golf course, or even a night out can boost morale. It encourages your crew/workers to socialize about things other than work, creating a more relaxing environment and allowing them to understand each other personally. 

While it's often challenging to fit in team building, more frequently due to busy schedules, calls, meetings, etc., we must find the time to avoid losing the most essential piece of our departments: our crew/workers. When individuals feel appreciated, valued, and refreshed, they are more likely to be on their A-game mentally and physically, which society relies on us for. A good leader must understand burnout and feel comfortable approaching our crew/workers and asking, "How can I support you?" or "Are you doing okay?". Sometimes, while this is not an easy question to ask, and we may not hear easy answers, it's how to ensure that workers/crew members feel listened to and supported. Overall, we must maintain the insight into how burnout affects the livelihood of our workers/members. 

Holding quarterly individual or small-scale meetings with your crew can be an easy way to maintain the insight. These meetings can often be utilized as a way to get ideas for the workplace but also to assure your firefighters, EMTs, police officers, etc., are doing okay both at work and home. Fire officers and other leaders say, "Their home life is not my concern." I can't entirely agree. The issue is not the leader's problem; however, its effect on the individual is an issue for the leader. You must ensure your employee prevents home issues from affecting decision-making on an emergency scene. Most importantly, if it affects them, take care of them; humans are allowed to have bad days and should not be punished. 

This article is just a tiny look into the effects of burnout in the workplace. Whether responding to a structure fire, heart attack victim, active shooter, answering and or dispatching 911 calls, assisting someone during a mental health crisis, or rushing patient to patient in an emergency room, our communities expect superhumans when they need help. It's our job as leaders to provide the best team for those in need and provide our first responders with the support to ensure they are physically and mentally on their A-game. I like the term superhuman. First responders are remarkable, and the mental and physical stress their bodies can handle is a super-hero quality. A better way to write it is superHUMAN, ensuring we acknowledge that even being considered "super," we are still human.



The Size-Up

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Let’s Talk Size Up! 

Talk. If you just talk is anyone listening? Well, they should be. But if you don’t send the message properly, not only will they not listen, but they will also not get the picture you are painting. So, what is size up? To me, it is much more than just talk. It is giving others the image you are seeing right now. It is giving them vital information about whatever the incident is at hand. Let’s just base this conversation on House fires. What are you looking for? Is it just the building? NOPE! There is so much more. What is the exterior telling you about the possible battles you may face? I recently read a post from OJ Kolodziej, a Fire Captain from Birmingham AL and the owner at Magic City Truck Academy, a Fire based training company similar to mine. If you don’t follow him, you should!  But he made a recent post on size up. It was a short post about vehicle size up at a house fire!  Yup vehicle size up. This simple method will help you find clues of what may be inside this home.  How? Glad ya asked, look into that vehicle instead of running past it!! Well, if you have a visible victim then yeah go past it. For the sake of this article, there are no visible victims. Look at the car, are there any car seats or booster seats, how many? What are the license plates? Handicap, or is there a handicap tag hanging on the mirror? What is the general condition of the car? Is it in shambles and full of stuff and things, this may give insight of the interior of the home. Is the hood warm? What does the back window have for stick figure stickers?? A vehicle can tell you a lot!  


Photo by Ryan Johnston, training burn Greenville Maine 

Now we have looked at the vehicle, what does the door yard look like? SQUIRREL!! Did you notice I didn’t talk about time of day? Yeah, I’m not going to. Now several years ago I might have. But as our world changes so does our size up factors. The lack of or having a vehicle in the driveway at any point day or night is not really a reason (in my opinion) to search more or less. Today’s culture has taught me that it doesn’t matter what time of day it or if a vehicle is present or not that I should not base my search on either of these items. They may direct me towards a targeted search, but not swaying my decision to search. With COVID and just the amount of people working from home, we are likely going to find victims regardless of the time of day.  

OK back to my original thought. You have taken note of the vehicle, and you are likely doing a 360.  What are you seeing? Building type, number of floors, is there the same number of floors in the front as there are in the rear? What are you smelling? What are the conditions? Smoke, Fire,  Nothing? If you do have smoke or fire, from where and how much? You can even get into the smoke volume, color, speed and density. Do you know what your water source is going to be?  What mode of attack will you be in? Offensive, Defensive, Investigation? Once you announce this info over the radio to the incoming units establish command. I am the worst person for a stationary command, but it is important. So, announce the location of command, rely on you officer staff to relay pertinent information to you as needed and once a command post is established stay there, if possible, see what I did there? In the fire service Never and Always are two bad words. The thing about size up is that it is always on going. As the incident changes the resources that you may need or not need changes. I try to reassess the incident every 10 to 15 minutes in the first hour.  After that the incident will dictate my time line. This article is no means the end all to size up. It is  just some of the things I do. Hopefully this will trigger you to look at how you size up your fires and  as always, if you have any questions or comments please reach out! I really enjoy it when we have  feedback, I learn so much from all of you, either when I am out strutting or if it is through this article sparking conversations. SO, how do you size up?  

Ryan Johnston

Owner, Maine-Iac Training

www.maineiactraining.org

ryan@maineiactraining.org

Burnout: Taking Care of Your Crew

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Often perceived as machines or "super-humans," firefighters can always answer the call 24/7. Everyone always expects firefighters to be there but seldom thinks about the toll it may take on the firefighters. Short staffing, hectic schedules, and specific incidents all contribute to burnout. Sometimes as an officer, you must ensure your crew is at its best.

As the fire service leader, it's essential to notice when members of your crew or department are dealing with burnout. 

The typical symptoms of burnout include:

  • A negative attitude toward others.

  • A lack of engagement within the workplace.

  • Exhaustion. 

So what exactly should you be looking for? Poor nutrition, loss of interest in the job, and lack of sleep are some of the most common signs of burnout. Another sign to look for would be the job performance of an individual. Firefighters are generally good at hiding feelings, with the fear of being labeled as not "tough enough" for the job. An example is a firefighter who usually works well as a team but starts freelancing and disobeying direct orders. Burnout affects the firefighter not only physically but mentally. In the mental capacity, it may cause cloudiness to your judgment, which could lead to injury or death for not only the individual but the crew and or civilians. 

You're the officer in charge, and it is your job to ensure your firefighters remain safe both on the scene and in the firehouse. If you notice one of your crew members is going through burnout, there are ways to help. Most importantly, talk to them! As the officer, pull them aside and explain that you’re seeing a change in them. Whether it be on a personal level or on the training ground. It’s also important to  let them know they're human, and feeling burnt out is ok. One downside to this is that crew members may not be receptive to a conversation like this. It can be an uncomfortable conversation to have. During this conversation the person may shut down and almost feel as if they’re being singled out. As mentioned earlier, firefighters rarely speak up for fear of criticism. During this conversation, suggest ways to cope with burnout. Some examples may be:

  • Writing.

  • Cooking.

  • Prioritizing sleep. 

  • Creating a fitness schedule. 

Among the easiest ways is to take advantage of their time off. Take a vacation, turn their phone off, and shut down from the fire service world for a few days. Doing this will allow the firefighter to reset. After all, how can we expect our firefighters to always bring their A-game if they're not in the right frame of mind?

In the United States, 88.2% of the fire service are male. You're probably saying, "Everyone knows that" It's evident if you look at any firehouse in America. However, what's not known is that approximately 84 men a week will take their own life. 75% of all suicides are male. These statistics include more than just firefighters or first responders. However, according to the National Fallen Firefighters Foundation, the number of firefighter suicides falls between 100 & 200 annually. This proves that the "macho man" mentality of firefighters and men increases due to males not usually reaching out for assistance. Regardless, having a crew member speak up about needing help will always be challenging. 

This doesn't mean you can't help in other ways. Most firehouses I've visited have bulletin boards typically filled with information for training and upcoming events. Someone may be more inclined to utilize the info if the rest of the firehouse won't know. Training boards can be a great place in the firehouse to post different foundations and hotline numbers for firefighters seeking help. 

With hectic schedules, budget cuts that reduce staffing, and the overall amount of incidents firefighters are responding to, it's more than likely as an officer; you will encounter a firefighter going through burnout. So as you move up the ranks, make sure you're looking out for yourself and your crew. Below are a few links to different organizations where you can find help or gather more information regarding burnout. 

Work Hard - Stay Safe - Live Inspired

https://www.usfa.fema.gov/blog/ig-051922.html

https://www.nextrung.org/

https://www.codegreencampaign.org/resources/

https://www.5-alarmtaskforcecorp.org/

https://paulcombsart.com



Remembering the West Texas Fertilizer Plant Explosion

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It was a typical spring evening with temperature s around 80 degrees on the evening of April 17, 2013 in central Texas. Humidity that evening was low with scattered clouds and 20 mile per hour winds blowing in from the south south east (SSE).

At around 7:30 that evening in the City of West, an explosion occurred at the West Fertilizer Company plant. An explosion so powered it registered as a 2.1 magnitude earthquake and felt over 80 miles away damaging many homes and school throughout the area. 

At this time, dispatched received a 911 call reporting smoke coming from the West Fertilizer Company plant and at 7:34 PM, the West Volunteer Fire Department was dispatched to the scene with two engines, a brush trick and tender responding to the scene along with two more firefighters arriving in their personal vehicles. The first arriving unit on scene was at approximately 7:39 PM confirming a structure fire at the plant and deployed an initial attack line (1 1/2 attack line) to extinguish any and all visible fire and to establish a water supply using a 4-inch diameter supply line. Please note, the nearest fire hydrant was more than a quarter mile away from the scene. An initial mutual aid alarm was struck with included an aerial ladder truck and four more firefighters which responded in their personal vehicles.  

Within 12 minutes of the initial arriving unit on scene and 22 minutes from the initial 911 dispatch, an explosion occurred at the plant leaving multiple firefighters down.

Ten first responders were killed in this explosion due to an estimated 40 to 60 tons of ammonium nitrate exploding just outside the city limits.

Five firefighters from the West Volunteer Fire Department were killed in the explosion along with four firefighters from 3 neighboring departments along with one off-duty career fire captain and two civilians who offered assistance to the fire department on scene. 

Factors of the incident

The department did not recognize the hazards associated with the ammonium nitrate

  • There was limited pre-planning of the facility

  • Rapid fire spread in wood construction commercial structure with no sprinkler system

Post incident recommendations as per NIOSH

Fire departments should conduct pre-incident planning of buildings within their jurisdiction to facilitate the development of safe fireground strategies and tactics especially in high hazard high risk structures

  • Fire departments should have a written management plan, use risk management principles at all structure fires and especially at incidents with high risk hazards

  • Fire departments should implement and enforce the Incident Management System (IMS) at all emergency operations

  • Fire departments should ensure all firefighters wear personal protective equipment appropriate for the assigned tasks

  • Fire departments should ensure all firefighters are training to the standards that meet or exceed NFPA 1001 Standard for Fire Fighter Professional Qualifications

 We remember:

Firefighter Morris Bridges

Firefighter Cody Dragoo

Firefighter Joseph Pustejovsky

Firefighter Douglas Snokhous

Firefighter Robert Snokhous

Firefighter Jerry Dane Chapman

Firefighter Cyrus Reed

Firefighter Kevin Saunders

Fire Captain Harris Kenneth

Firefighter Perry Calvin


Remembering March 25th A Day of Disaster

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March 25th: A day of disaster

March 25th is an essential date in fire history. On this date in 1911 was "The Triangle Shirtwaist Fire" and 79 years later, "The Happy Land Social Club Fire."

Two of the most deadly fires occurred on this date, both in New York City.

TRIANGLE SHIRTWAIST FIRE

One hundred forty-six young female immigrants perished in the act of negligence. The fire, which broke out on March 25th, 1911, just before 4 pm, was believed to of started in a bin filled with scraps of rags and fabrics by a discarded cigarette. The Triangle Factory occupied the top three floors of the Asch Building, located at the corner of Greene Street and Washington Place in Manhattan, NY. The working areas were cramped and consisted of nearly 600 young women working at the time. The building did have four elevators; however, only one was working at the time of the fire. There were usually buckets of water throughout the factory in case of a fire; however, Mary Domsky-Abrams, an employee of the building, stated that the buckets were empty that day.  

When the fire broke out, one of the managers attempted to extinguish the fire. Panic began to set in once the extinguishment was proven unsuccessful. Workers tried to flee the building, but as mentioned, only one working elevator slowed that down and eventually, the elevator was compromised due to the heat from the fire. Although many employees and managers could escape to the rooftop and flee to adjoining buildings, many young women were met with horrible deaths. Upon arrival, the fire department witnessed employees jumping out of windows, falling to their death. Many employees also decided to jump to their deaths in the elevator shaft, and others burned alive when they came across a locked door.

There was strong evidence of negligence against Max Blanckand Isaac Harris, who owned the Triangle Factory. Despite the evidence, a grand jury failed to indict them of manslaughter. Although too late for the 146 victims of this fire, politicians united to ensure there were rights for factory workers. New York State Legislators created the Factory Investigating Commission, which inspected working conditions in garment factories, chemical factories, and meat packing warehouses.

HAPPY LAND SOCIAL CLUB

Exactly seventy-nine years later, on March 25th, 1990, Julio Gonzalez argued with his girlfriend, which led him to set fire to the social club. Located in the Bronx, NY, The Happy Land Social Club was a popular weekend hangout, often crowded all night.

At approximately 3 am, a bouncer removed Julio Gonzalez from the social club after arguing with his girlfriend, an employee at the nightclub. Gonzalez arrived back at the nightclub at approximately 3:30 am with gasoline. When he returned, he found the stairwell with the only exit and soaked it with gasoline before throwing two matches and going home. Killing 87 people; this was the most deadly fire since 1911. Sixteen months before the fire, the social club was ordered to close due to building code infractions. Happy Land had no fire alarms, the emergency exits, or lack thereof, were blocked by roll-down security gates, and there were no sprinklers. Due to this, some victims were trampled due to a cluster of people in certain areas. Most of the victims perished due to smoke inhalation. Only six people escaped the fire. Among them was Julio Gonzalezs' girlfriend, Lydia Feliciano. She advised the police of her and Julio's argument, which led them to his home, where he confessed to the arson.

Julio Gonzalez was charged with 174 counts of murder, two for each victim, and was found guilty on 87 counts of arson and 87 counts of murder. He was sentenced to 25 years to life; he died in 2016. Immediately following the fire, the New York City Department of Buildings began a crackdown on illegal nightclubs. Laws exist for sprinkler systems, access points, occupancy limits, and emergency exits.

The following links contain first-hand info on the incidents mentioned, including an interview with Ruben Valladares, a DJ at Happy Land. For more information, I encourage you to search for the events online. There are multiple resources packed with in-depth information on the incidents.

Triangle Factory - https://www.history.com/news/triangle-shirtwaist-factory-fire-labor-safety-laws

Happy Land - https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/25/nyregion/happy-land-fire-bronx.html

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