Remembering Firefighter George Jackson

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On October 21, 1990, Firefighter George Jackson was assigned to engine company that was dispatched to a report of a stove fire at an occupied two-story brick row house in Camden, NJ. Upon arrival, firefighters found smoke showing from the rear of the structure causing the company officer to call for a box assignment at the location. Firefighter Jackson and his crew was shortly thereafter assigned to fire suppression and advanced a handline into the structure and conducted a search of the first floor.

When the ladder company arrived on scene and entered the structure with their crew, Firefighter Jackson split from the engine company and joined the ladder company to the second floor of the structure and began assisting in search. It was at this time that the fire in the kitchen on the first floor had proven too difficult to control along with the pump operate having difficultly opening the fire hydrant in front of the house to establish a water supply. Due to the issue with the hydrant outside, the pump operator of the engine radioed that crews should back of the structure due to water supply issues.  

At this time, the fire in the kitchen had began to spread rapidly prohibiting the firefighters from the ladder company on the second floor to exit the structure due to heat and fire conditions on the stairs. Three of the firefighters retreated back to the second floor and were able to exit the structure through second floor windows however, Firefighter Jackson was overcome by the conditions inside the structure and was unable to exit.  

Later arriving fire companies were able to establish an alternate water supply and suppress the fire that had spread onto the second floor. It was at this time, where firefighter accessing the second floor over ground ladders found Firefighter Jackson just inside the window and was extricated shortly thereafter. He suffered from critical hand and face burns and was transported to a nearby hospital. 

Firefighter George Jackson remained in a coma until his death on March 7, 2006 at the age of 67.

We remember…

Firefighter George Malcolm Jackson, Ladder 2, Camden Fire Department (NJ)

Remembering Lt. Arnie (Arnold) Wolff

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On Sunday, August 13, 2006, Lieutenant Arnie Wolff, assigned to the ambulance for the shift responded to a call at 438 Edgewood Drive around 12:30 afternoon. Upon arrival Lt. Wolff and his partner were assigned to assist the first due engine with attaching the 5-inch supply line to the engine for water supply. The engine company they were assisting with the supply line was currently conducting an attack on a suspected basement fire, while the ladder company was performing horizontal ventilation of the structure. The Incident Commander had then requested Lt. Wolff and his partner to conduct a primary search of the residence. With a few steps into the residence at around 12:34 PM, while beginning a lefthanded search, it was quickly noted there was near zero visibility with minimal heat conditions. Due to these conditions, the crew knelt down, sounded the ceramic floor and took one crawling step to advance in. Moments later, a large crack was heard just before the floor gave way, sending both firefighters into the basement.

A second alarm was immediately requested by the IC and rescue efforts began. The firefighter with Lt. Wolff fell into a finished portion of the basement and was assisted through a basement window by fellow firefighters. Lt Wolff fell into a room of the basement that did not have windows and his path to an exit was blocked. Due to the advanced fire conditions after the collapse, firefighters were unable to reach Lt. Wolff. His body was recovered 13 hours into the incident and his cause of death was asphyxiation due to smoke inhalation.

An autopsy was later performed and it was found that the carboxyhemoglobin level in Lieutenant Wolff's blood was 49.6 percent. The cause of the fire at the time was undetermined but it was concluded that the fire had been burning for some time in the basement prior to its discovery. The trusses that failed were in the area that was most damaged by fire. It is to be noted, the trusses that failed were TGI trusses, an engineered lumber product.

Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation Report F2006-26 | NIOSH | CDC

Arnie Wolff joined the Green Bay Fire Department in January 1989 and was currently assigned to Engine 451 at Station 5 and was also a paramedic. He was 5 days from receiving his promotion to lieutenant and was awarded it posthumously. Wolff leaves behind his wife and three children.

We remember…

Lt. Arnie (Arnold) Wolff, 55, Engine 451, Green Bay Fire Department

Remembering Lieutenant Nathan Flynn

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In the early morning of July 23, 2018, at approximately 0200hours, Howard County Department of Fire and Rescue Services was dispatched to lightning-caused structure fire in a single-family residence in Clarksville, Maryland.  

Shortly after arriving on scene, Lieutenant Nathan Flynn and his crew were advancing a hose line into the structure when the floor collapsed.  A Mayday was initiated around 0220hours by Lt. Flynn and another member of the crew. All of the crew members were rescued after about 20 minutes in burning basement at approximately 0245hours. 

Lt. Flynn was transported to the hospital but did not survive his injuries.  The cause of death was multiple injuries. 

He was the first line of duty death in the history of Howard County. 

Incident Location: 7000 Block of Woodscape Road, Clarksville, MD (U.S. National Grid: U.S. National Grid: 18S UJ 34363 39282 (DD: 39.187, -76.918)) 

Lessons Learned as per NIOSH 

  • Fire departments should ensure that crew integrity is properly maintained by visual (eye-to-eye), direct (touch), or verbal (voice or radio) contact at all times when operating in an immediately dangerous to life and health (IDLH) atmosphere. The intent is to prevent firefighters from becoming lost or missing

  • Fire departments should ensure incident commanders conduct a detailed scene size-up and risk assessment during initial fireground operations and throughout the incident including Side Charlie

  • Fire departments should develop and implement a standard operating procedure/guideline (SOP/SOG) to identify below-grade fires and ensure that appropriate tactical operations are implemented

  • Fire departments should ensure that a deployment strategy for low-frequency/high-risk incidents is developed and implemented for large area residential structures with unique architectural features

  • Fire departments should ensure that incident commanders develop an incident action plan (IAP) that matches conditions encountered during initial operations and throughout the incident

  • Fire departments should ensure that critical incident benchmarks and fire conditions are communicated to incident commanders throughout the incident. This is accomplished with effective fireground communications

  • Fire departments should have a procedure to ensure all members operating in the hazard zone have their radios on the designated radio channel

  • Fire departments should ensure all members and dispatchers are trained on the safety features of their portable radio, particularly the features useful during a Mayday

  • Fire departments should develop a process to prevent task saturation of incident commanders during multi-alarm incidents

  • Fire departments should ensure that the member assigned to the resource status and situation status function is not given other duties during an incident

  • Fire departments should develop a formal training program that defines the job duties and functions for staff aides, incident command technicians, or staff assistants

  • Fire departments should ensure incident commanders maintain control of situation status, resources status, and communications to ensure the completion of tactical objectives

  • Fire departments should incorporate the principles of Command Safety into the incident management system during the initial assumption of command. This ensures that strategic-level safety responsibilities are being incorporated into the command functions throughout the incident

  • Fire departments should review and/or develop SOG/SOPs to ensure that water supply is established during initial fireground operations, particularly in areas with limited or no hydrants

  • Fire departments should ensure adequate staffing and deployment of resources based on the community’s risk assessment

  • Fire department should periodically review and, if necessary, revise their SOP/SOG on the deployment of rapid intervention crews (RICs)

  • Fire departments should use resources from the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), Underwriter’s Laboratories (UL) Fire Safety Research Institute (FSRI), and the International Society of Fire Service Instructors (ISFSI) to develop and revise operational procedures on fireground tactics and provide training in fire dynamics in structures for all firefighting staff

  • Fire departments should consider having all members carry a wire cutting tool  

We remember… 

Lieutenant Nathan "Nate" Flynn, 34, Howard County Department of Fire and Rescue Services

Remembering the Southwest Inn Motel Fire - Houston, TX

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May 31, 2013 was the deadliest day in the history of Houston Fire Department. The Southwest Inn fire killed four Houston Fire Department members, injured many others with one additional firefighter who lost his life due to his injuries a few years later.

The Structure

The Southwest Inn Motel which was a well-known motel for many decades in the Houston area was located at 6855 Southwest Freeway in Houston, Texas. The property included the motel itself, with restaurant and bar spanning over 26,000 square feet. The layout consisted of the restaurant and bar being a single-story structure that was interconnected to the two-story structure that housed the motel's lobby, offices, banquet halls and meeting rooms. In addition to this facility, the property also housed seven individual two-story buildings of motel guest rooms, none of which were connected to the main interconnected building where the fire took place.

The motel was constructed of primarily wood-frame construction consisting of lightweight construction materials such as lightweight truss and combustible roof decking. The building did not contain a fire sprinkler or automatic fire alarm system. The one notable characteristic of this structure was the extruded concrete interlocking roof tiles over asphalt shingles used for the front-facing slopes over the banquet and restaurant areas.


The Incident

At 12:07PM, the Houston Fire Department was dispatched to the Southwest Inn for a reported fire. Engine 51 was located less than a mile from the motel and responded moments after the initial dispatch.

During their response in, Engine 51 (E51) officer reported heavy smoke visible and from there an immediate request by the Office of Emergency Communication to dispatch a working fire. Additional units reported dark grey and brown smoke coming from the structure will enroute to the scene.

Three and half minutes later upon arrival, E51 reported heavy smoke showing from the attic of the restaurant and will begin an offensive fire attack with a 2 1/2-inch line. This line was the rear preconnect from E51.

The district chief (D68) arrived on scene moments later and established command. The IC's first order was E51 evacuate the building because the operate of E51 advised the engine was down to a quarter tank of later. Engine 68 then arrived on scene and laid two 4-inch supply lines from E51 to a hydrant east of the structure and E51 from there was able to establish a water supply. E51's crew was then able to re-enter the structure with the back-up crew coming from E68 with another 2 1/2-inch line.

A fourth due engine company - Engine 82 was on scene advancing an 1 3/4-inch hoseline to the front door that was also entered by E51 when the roof collapsed occurred.

Within 12 minutes of Engine 51 (e51) arriving on scene and 15 and a half minutes of the initial dispatch the roof of the restaurant had collapsed. The captain of Engine 51 was at the front door during the collapse and pushed out of the building. The captain of Engine 82 called a "Mayday" and rapid intervention crew operations were initiated by Engine 60.

Due to the initial collapse of the roof and during the RIC operations taking place, a secondary wall collapsed occurred injuring several firefighter of the RIC team. The crew continued their efforts in located and removing the trapped firefighters. The captain of E68 was located and removed from the structure and transported to a local hospital. The engineer of E51 was removed from the structure as well however later died at a local hospital.

The search continued on for the captain of E51 and two remaining firefighters from E68. Approximately two hours had passed after the initial roof collapse and the body of the captain from E51 was located. The captain was found on top of the restaurant roof debris and the two missing firefighters from E68 were discovered underneath the debris. All three were pronounced dead at the scene.

Factors

• Unreported fire burning for 3 hours

• Delay in notifying the fire department

• Building construction

• Wind driven fire

• Scene size-up

• Accountability

• Fireground communications

• Lack of fire sprinkler system

Key Recommendations

• Based upon fire department procedures, the strategy and tactics for an occupancy should be defined by the organization for fire-fighting operations. The Incident Commander should ensure that the strategy and tactics match the conditions encountered during initial operations and throughout the incident

• Fire departments should review and update standard operating procedures on wind-driven fires which are incorporated into fireground tactics

• Fire departments should integrate current fire behavior research findings developed by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and Underwriter’s Laboratories (U.L.) into operational procedures by developing standard operating procedures, conducting live fire training, and revising fireground tactics

We Remember…

Captain Matthew Renaud, 35, Engine 51

Engineer Operator Robert Bebee, 41, Engine 58

Firefighter Robert Garner, 29, Engine 68

Probationary Firefighter Anne Sullivan, 24 Engine 68

Captain William "Iron Bill" Dowling, Engine 68, retired after the incident and passed away on March 7, 2017 due to injuries sustained from the incident.


Remembering Captain Mike Goodwin

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Philadelphia Fire Department Ladder 27 was dispatched as the Rapid Intervention Team also known as RIT to a structure fire at 748 South 4th Street in Philadelphia, PA on the evening of April 6, 2013. The fire began in the basement of a fabric store which had extended to the upper floors of the three story store front structure with apartments above. 

Captain Mike Goodwin was the officer in charge of Ladder 27 for the shift. Upon arrival, Ladder 27 RIT company staged their equipment near the command post and the IC (Incident Commander) assigned them to the roof of an adjacent structure to perform ventilation operations. It was at this time, Captain Goodwin reported to command there was heavy smoke conditions coming from the exposure they were shortly going to be operating on. Donned in full PPE w, Captain Goodwin fell 20 feet onto the roof of the building and shortly after fell through the roof into the fire building. 

Firefighters on scene reported this fall to the IC and rescue operations were quickly put into place in attempts to rescue Captain Goodwin. Due to limited access to the roof area and fire conditions, access was limited. During rescue efforts, firefighters breached an exterior brick wall to gain access to his location where he was removed from the structure and transported to the hospital. Additionally, Firefighter Andrew Godlinski was injured while attempting to rescue Captain Goodwin following the collapse before a second floor roof and two walls collapsed.

Captain Mike Goodwin of Ladder 27 was pronounced dead at the hospital due to what was listed as multiple blunt force injuries. He was posthumously promoted to Battalion Chief. 

Captain Goodwin is survived by his wife and two children. 

We Remember…

Captain Mike Goodwin, age 53, Philadelphia Fire Department, Ladder 27

Remembering the West Texas Fertilizer Plant Explosion

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It was a typical spring evening with temperature s around 80 degrees on the evening of April 17, 2013 in central Texas. Humidity that evening was low with scattered clouds and 20 mile per hour winds blowing in from the south south east (SSE).

At around 7:30 that evening in the City of West, an explosion occurred at the West Fertilizer Company plant. An explosion so powered it registered as a 2.1 magnitude earthquake and felt over 80 miles away damaging many homes and school throughout the area. 

At this time, dispatched received a 911 call reporting smoke coming from the West Fertilizer Company plant and at 7:34 PM, the West Volunteer Fire Department was dispatched to the scene with two engines, a brush trick and tender responding to the scene along with two more firefighters arriving in their personal vehicles. The first arriving unit on scene was at approximately 7:39 PM confirming a structure fire at the plant and deployed an initial attack line (1 1/2 attack line) to extinguish any and all visible fire and to establish a water supply using a 4-inch diameter supply line. Please note, the nearest fire hydrant was more than a quarter mile away from the scene. An initial mutual aid alarm was struck with included an aerial ladder truck and four more firefighters which responded in their personal vehicles.  

Within 12 minutes of the initial arriving unit on scene and 22 minutes from the initial 911 dispatch, an explosion occurred at the plant leaving multiple firefighters down.

Ten first responders were killed in this explosion due to an estimated 40 to 60 tons of ammonium nitrate exploding just outside the city limits.

Five firefighters from the West Volunteer Fire Department were killed in the explosion along with four firefighters from 3 neighboring departments along with one off-duty career fire captain and two civilians who offered assistance to the fire department on scene. 

Factors of the incident

The department did not recognize the hazards associated with the ammonium nitrate

  • There was limited pre-planning of the facility

  • Rapid fire spread in wood construction commercial structure with no sprinkler system

Post incident recommendations as per NIOSH

Fire departments should conduct pre-incident planning of buildings within their jurisdiction to facilitate the development of safe fireground strategies and tactics especially in high hazard high risk structures

  • Fire departments should have a written management plan, use risk management principles at all structure fires and especially at incidents with high risk hazards

  • Fire departments should implement and enforce the Incident Management System (IMS) at all emergency operations

  • Fire departments should ensure all firefighters wear personal protective equipment appropriate for the assigned tasks

  • Fire departments should ensure all firefighters are training to the standards that meet or exceed NFPA 1001 Standard for Fire Fighter Professional Qualifications

 We remember:

Firefighter Morris Bridges

Firefighter Cody Dragoo

Firefighter Joseph Pustejovsky

Firefighter Douglas Snokhous

Firefighter Robert Snokhous

Firefighter Jerry Dane Chapman

Firefighter Cyrus Reed

Firefighter Kevin Saunders

Fire Captain Harris Kenneth

Firefighter Perry Calvin


Remembering March 25th A Day of Disaster

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March 25th: A day of disaster

March 25th is an essential date in fire history. On this date in 1911 was "The Triangle Shirtwaist Fire" and 79 years later, "The Happy Land Social Club Fire."

Two of the most deadly fires occurred on this date, both in New York City.

TRIANGLE SHIRTWAIST FIRE

One hundred forty-six young female immigrants perished in the act of negligence. The fire, which broke out on March 25th, 1911, just before 4 pm, was believed to of started in a bin filled with scraps of rags and fabrics by a discarded cigarette. The Triangle Factory occupied the top three floors of the Asch Building, located at the corner of Greene Street and Washington Place in Manhattan, NY. The working areas were cramped and consisted of nearly 600 young women working at the time. The building did have four elevators; however, only one was working at the time of the fire. There were usually buckets of water throughout the factory in case of a fire; however, Mary Domsky-Abrams, an employee of the building, stated that the buckets were empty that day.  

When the fire broke out, one of the managers attempted to extinguish the fire. Panic began to set in once the extinguishment was proven unsuccessful. Workers tried to flee the building, but as mentioned, only one working elevator slowed that down and eventually, the elevator was compromised due to the heat from the fire. Although many employees and managers could escape to the rooftop and flee to adjoining buildings, many young women were met with horrible deaths. Upon arrival, the fire department witnessed employees jumping out of windows, falling to their death. Many employees also decided to jump to their deaths in the elevator shaft, and others burned alive when they came across a locked door.

There was strong evidence of negligence against Max Blanckand Isaac Harris, who owned the Triangle Factory. Despite the evidence, a grand jury failed to indict them of manslaughter. Although too late for the 146 victims of this fire, politicians united to ensure there were rights for factory workers. New York State Legislators created the Factory Investigating Commission, which inspected working conditions in garment factories, chemical factories, and meat packing warehouses.

HAPPY LAND SOCIAL CLUB

Exactly seventy-nine years later, on March 25th, 1990, Julio Gonzalez argued with his girlfriend, which led him to set fire to the social club. Located in the Bronx, NY, The Happy Land Social Club was a popular weekend hangout, often crowded all night.

At approximately 3 am, a bouncer removed Julio Gonzalez from the social club after arguing with his girlfriend, an employee at the nightclub. Gonzalez arrived back at the nightclub at approximately 3:30 am with gasoline. When he returned, he found the stairwell with the only exit and soaked it with gasoline before throwing two matches and going home. Killing 87 people; this was the most deadly fire since 1911. Sixteen months before the fire, the social club was ordered to close due to building code infractions. Happy Land had no fire alarms, the emergency exits, or lack thereof, were blocked by roll-down security gates, and there were no sprinklers. Due to this, some victims were trampled due to a cluster of people in certain areas. Most of the victims perished due to smoke inhalation. Only six people escaped the fire. Among them was Julio Gonzalezs' girlfriend, Lydia Feliciano. She advised the police of her and Julio's argument, which led them to his home, where he confessed to the arson.

Julio Gonzalez was charged with 174 counts of murder, two for each victim, and was found guilty on 87 counts of arson and 87 counts of murder. He was sentenced to 25 years to life; he died in 2016. Immediately following the fire, the New York City Department of Buildings began a crackdown on illegal nightclubs. Laws exist for sprinkler systems, access points, occupancy limits, and emergency exits.

The following links contain first-hand info on the incidents mentioned, including an interview with Ruben Valladares, a DJ at Happy Land. For more information, I encourage you to search for the events online. There are multiple resources packed with in-depth information on the incidents.

Triangle Factory - https://www.history.com/news/triangle-shirtwaist-factory-fire-labor-safety-laws

Happy Land - https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/25/nyregion/happy-land-fire-bronx.html

Work Hard - Stay Safe - Live Inspired

We Remember: Black Sunday FDNY

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January 23rd, 2005.  One of the darkest days in FDNY history. A day the department lost multiple firefighters in two different incidents. Known to first responders worldwide as "Black Sunday."

Bronx: While performing a search during a three-alarm fire, Lieutenant John Bellew of Ladder 27, firefighter Joseph DiBernardo of Rescue 3, and  Lieutenant Curtis Meyran of Battalion 26 became trapped on the fourth floor of a four-story apartment. Due to the increased heat and fire, all three firefighters were forced to jump from the window to the ground. The apartment building was an older building from the late 1920s. The apartments involved were made into single-room occupancies (SRO). Each shares a common bathroom and kitchen. According to the NIOSH report, each SRO had a padlock on the bedroom doors. There was also limited access at the rear fire escape due to a partition with wood framing and sheetrock. In addition, there were no permits issued for construction in the building, and there were also no automatic sprinklers making the construction project a violation of local building codes. In addition to the three firefighters mentioned earlier, Brendan Cawley, Jeff Cool, and Gene Stolowski were severely injured in the jump. Later that day, Lieutenants John Bellew and Curtis Meyran succumbed to their injuries. Firefighter DiBernardo was promoted to Lieutenant in the spring of 2005. Unfortunately, Lt. DiBernardo passed away in 2011 due to complications with injuries sustained on January 23rd, 2005.

Brooklyn: Sometime just before 2 pm that same day, FDNY units were dispatched to a basement fire in a private dwelling. One of the first arriving units was Ladder Company 103. Part of the crew was firefighter Richard Sclafani who was assigned to search the basement. Due to fire conditions changing, firefighter Sclafani became separated from his company during the search. Minutes after being separated, Sclafani was located unconscious and in respiratory arrest. The NIOSH report stated firefighters worked on removing him from the building for 20 minutes. Firefighter Sclafani succumbed to his injuries, and the official cause of death was smoke inhalation and burns. January 23rd, 2005 marked the first time since 1918 that the FDNY lost firefighters in separate incidents.

Following the incident, the FDNY completed its internal investigation, and personal escape systems were purchased for all firefighters. Had the systems been available to the firefighters on Black Sunday, it would have saved the lives of Lieutenants Bellew, DiBernardo, and Meyran and prevented injuries to firefighters Cawley, Cool, and Stolowski. Black Sunday is a day that will be remembered forever in fire history. There is plenty of material on multiple sites providing information. I encourage new and veteran firefighters to remain educated on this day and learn from it.

In 2013, the Lt. Joseph P. DiBernardo Memorial Foundation, also known as the Joey D Foundation, was started to help train and equip firefighters in need. I have personally attended the yearly seminar they hold on Long Island. The training weekend is filled with two days of hands-on training followed by a day of great lectures. World-class instructors and firefighters teach all classes and lessons. The foundation raises money to provide fire departments with funding for personal escape systems, helping ensure an incident such as "Black Sunday" doesn't happen again.

NIOSH report for the Bronx fire

https://www.cdc.gov/niosh/fire/reports/face200503.html

NIOSH report for the Brooklyn fire

https://www.cdc.gov/niosh/fire/reports/face200504.html

Photos from firerescue1.com

Remembering Firefighter John Nance

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10:10 pm, the Columbus Division of Fire was dispatched to North High Street for a report of

smoke coming from the 1st floor of the Mithoff Building. At 10:12 pm, Engine 1 arrived on the scene

immediately, followed by Engine 9 and Engine 3. Firefighter John Nance was acting Lieutenant on Engine

3.

The Division of Fire used a “battle plan” consisting of two task forces to fight downtown fires.

Acting Lieutenant Nance was with Taskforce two and was staged at the rear of the building. His crew

noticed smoke hanging low to the sidewalk, indicating a basement fire. Nance and his crew from Engine

3 entered the building, joined by teams from Ladder 2 and Engine 2 shortly after. The smoke was so

dense the crews were forced to crawl while advancing the charged hose line.

Approximately 30 minutes into the incident, a second alarm was transmitted. While there was

still no visible fire, the smoke was increasing. Met with a significant amount of smoke and heat, Nance

and his crew continued to search for access to the basement. Unable to access the basement and

quickly exhausted, Nance and his crew vacated the building to cool down and switch out air bottles.

Now, after numerous research attempts, it seems no one knows what happened to Firefighter

John Nance other than he fell through the floor into the basement. A hole was found where he fell

through, leaving firefighters and officials to believe he was cutting a hole to the basement. Firefighters

were attempting to rescue FF Nance utilizing ropes and hose lines. As the fire began to show, Nance had

run out of air. The Assistant Chief started to remove people from the fire. Using a “search rope” type

technique, firefighters once again entered the building in a final attempt to save FF Nance. Firefighters

were again pulled from the building; last attempts were made to gain access to firefighter Nance, but all

turned empty.

Eventually reaching the 4th alarm, the fire was placed under control around 5 am.

Unfortunately, FF Nance did not make it out of the fire, and his body was recovered on the afternoon of

July 26th. According to reports, the building was intentionally set on fire, making this line of duty death a

murder.

As always, a line of duty death results in training tactics for firefighters. This LODD brought us

the “John Nance Drill” or “Hole in the floor.” The drill removes firefighters from a basement should stairs

or easier access not be available. I have attached a link to watch it here

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=umzJmtMHrdA this incident also shows the importance of using a

search rope or tag line. Although firefighters had a hose line to follow in this incident, a search rope still

provides an additional tool to help guide a firefighter out and to assist firefighters in to assist a downed

firefighter should anything happen.

I must admit, when looking for my LODD topic this month, I was unaware of John Nance. As I

researched it and found multiple articles and stories, I became a bit obsessed with always looking for

more information. To my knowledge and what I have seen, the murder has yet to be solved, officials and

investigators have found why the building was set on fire but have yet to find out who started it. I found

a story written by Michael Norman on FFprovinggrounds.com. Mr. Norman, a writer for Columbus

Monthly, provides detail on the incident in his write-up. I encourage anyone unfamiliar with this to do

an internet search and read up on it.

**Video link provided by FFprovinggrounds YouTube page**

Remembering the Hackensack Ford Fire

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On July 1, 1988, when firefighters of the Hackensack Fire Department arrived on scene of the Ford dealership on River Street in Hackensack, NJ around 3pm, they did not know how deceptive the fire would prove to be. They did not know that five of their fellow firefighters would not be coming home. On the initial alarm, Hackensack firefighters on two engines, one ladder and chief car responded to a reported fire at the Hackensack Ford auto dealership. During fire operations, fire was discovered to be burning above in the truss over the service area and was vented by the truck company on scene. Fire suppression was attempted by both engine companies through two ceiling hatches above the service area. Shortly thereafter, an evacuation order was transmitted over the radio of which were not acknowledged by any of the units working on scene.

Otherwise known as the Hackensack Ford Fire, this fire claimed the lives of five firefighters battling a fire in a bowstring-truss building when the roof suddenly collapsed. Three of the five firefighters lost their lives in the middle of the service area of the dealership. The other two firefighters became trapped in the rear storage room and were unable to be rescued. After approximately 1 hour into the operation, these five firefighter lost their lives and were the first line of duty deaths in the department's 117 year history to that point.

Remember & Honor

Capt. Richard L. Williams (Engine Co. No. 304)

Lt. Richard R. Reinhagen (Engine Co. No. 302)

Firefighter William Krejsa (Engine Co. No. 301)

Firefighter Leonard Radumski (Engine Co. No. 302)

Firefighter Stephen Ennis (Engine Co. No. 308).

34 years later this fire has had significant impact on today's fire service. This fire is one of the most analyzed LODD events in the history of the fire service. Numerous issues were noted from the incident including a breakdown in communications. The findings and observations of this fire are still valid today.

The lessons of this fire has resonated deeply within the fire service across the country. The Hackensack Ford Fire caused the fire service to begin looking at building construction on a more serious level especially when operation in and around truss construction and having the ability to identify construction types and truss. It also highlighted a weak command structure, insufficient and ineffective radio communications along with a lack of portable radios for firefighters and a lack of manpower. These lesson stay true to this day.

In an article published the day after the tragedy, Fire Chief Anthony Aiellos said, “There are only 100 of us in this department, and this is just a small place. In a town like this, these are your friends. These were good men.”